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Administrative intensity is arguably a major determinant of public service 
performance. Although a large administrative function might constitute a bureaucratic 
burden, it could also enable organizations to better coordinate key activities. In 
particular, administrative intensity may strengthen or weaken the performance effects 
of other key organizational characteristics, such as size and task complexity. To 
explore these ideas, we analyse the separate and combined effects of administrative 
intensity, organization size and task complexity on the research and educational 
performance of UK universities between 2005 and 2011. The statistical results 
suggest administrative intensity has a performance pay-off for big and complex 
organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been fashionable to suggest that bureaucratic public organizations are 
likely to perform worse than their ‘leaner’ and more flexible counterparts (Peters, 
2001). Whether by generating excessive overheads, cumbersome reporting 
requirements or being unresponsive to stakeholders, organizations with a large central 
administrative component are thought to be unable to deliver services efficiently and 
effectively. Yet the administrative centre of an organization also constitutes a stock of 
human resources that can potentially be mobilised for the delivery of better services 
(Adler and Borys, 1996). In this respect, a high degree of central administrative 
intensity (the ratio of ’back office’ resources to front-line resources) may be necessary 
to sustain high performance. In particular, the effects of an array of internal and 
external variables on performance may be contingent on administrative intensity. 
Although there have been a number of recent studies examining the determinants of 
administrative intensity and overheads in public organizations (e.g. Boon and 
Verhoest, 2014; Boyne and Meier, 2013; Rutherford, 2016; Van Helden and Huijben, 
2014), surprisingly little is still known about whether and when bureaucracy matters 
for public service performance. Researchers have analysed the role that the central 
administration might play in buffering organizations from external forces (e.g. 
Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker, 2013; Meier and O’Toole 2009). 
Nevertheless, the possibility that central administrative intensity may lead to better 
performance by strengthening or moderating the effects of key internal organizational 
characteristics  has yet to be thoroughly explored. To address this gap in the literature, 
we examine the separate and combined effects of administrative intensity, 
organization size and task complexity on the research and education performance of 
universities in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2005 and 2011. 
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By extending previous research on administrative intensity, we are able to 
highlight that not only is bureaucracy a function of other important organizational 
contingencies, but that it is a design feature that can have major implications for the 
effectiveness of public organizations. The central administrative function of an 
organization typically comprises those personnel with no direct role in service 
production, such as the senior management team, corporate services (e.g. finance, 
human resources, IT, marketing), and other workers providing services to the whole 
of an organization (Handel, 2014). The administration function is therefore 
distinguished from those functions responsible for the delivery of services (e.g. 
professionals and street-level bureaucrats in public organizations). Since the 
administrative function is an “overhead” that must be added to direct service costs 
(Van Helden and Huijben 2014), it is likely to have an influence on the performance 
of public organizations. Contingency theorists, in particular, draw attention to the 
ways in which the benefits of bureaucracy for organizational outcomes may be felt 
through its relationship with other internal characteristics, especially the sheer size of 
an organization and its internal task complexity (Van de Ven, Ganco and Hinings 
2013). Large central bureaucracies may be required to better manage bigger and more 
complex organizations, and this, in turn, may result in a positive performance pay-off.   
To investigate this issue, we carry out statistical analyses of the relationship 
between the administrative intensity of UK universities, their size and task complexity 
and measures of research and educational performance. First, we review prior 
research, which suggests that the relationship between administrative intensity and 
performance may take a variety of forms, before exploring the potential for 
administrative intensity to moderate the relationships between size and complexity 
and performance. Thereafter, we outline our statistical model and the measures of 
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organizational performance used for the analysis. We then present our findings, 
discuss the statistically significant effects that emerge, and draw theoretical and policy 
conclusions. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 
The literature on administrative intensity in the public sector has tended to take the 
standpoint that a large administrative component constitutes a ‘bureaucratic burden’ 
on organizations (Boon and Verhoest 2014). According to public choice theorists, in 
particular, senior managers of public organizations create a large administrative 
function because the resources that they receive from government are rarely 
dependent upon the efficient production of services (Chubb and Moe 1990). However, 
despite popular antipathy towards ‘bureaucracy’ in public organizations (Downs and 
Larkey 1986), it is quite possible that administrative intensity is actually associated 
with better performance. Aside from the benefits of efficient and equitable decision-
making conventionally associated with bureaucratic modes of organizing public 
services (Goodsell 1985), organizations with a strong administrative component may 
also be better placed to synchronize the many moving parts that are present within 
public bureaucracies (Van Helden and Huijben 2014). 
Within the generic management literature, one of the main benefits of 
administrative intensity is generally thought to be the propensity for organizations 
with a bigger ‘back office’ to devote more time and resource to performance-
enhancing activities. For example, Sine, Mitsuhashi and Kirsch’s (2006) analysis of 
the performance of new internet companies between 1996 and 2001 reveals that new 
ventures with high levels of administrative intensity outperform their “leaner” 
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counterparts, because they have greater capacity for managing the initial phases of 
business start-up. Furthermore, a review of the determinants of service innovation in 
the public sector suggests that administrative intensity is a critical success factor 
(Walker 2013). However, to date, evidence on the benefits and costs of administrative 
intensity for public service performance is less clear-cut.  
In an early study, Bidwell and Kasarda (1975) report a negative relationship 
between school district performance and administrative intensity. Subsequently, there 
has been much debate in the US, in particular, about ‘bureaucracy’ and school 
performance, which has drawn upon measures of administrative intensity to assess 
whether organizations with a bigger bureaucratic component   perform better or worse 
(see Smith and Larrimer 2004). The evidence on this issue though has largely been 
inconclusive, indicating that the relationship may be nonlinear rather than linear in 
form. Indeed, Rutherford (2016) recently identified an inverted u-shaped relationship 
between administrative intensity and the educational performance of universities in 
the United States, suggesting that as administrative intensity rises, it may expand 
beyond its usefulness for supporting the core activities of the organization. Thus, there 
is good reason to expect that administrative intensity will, up to a point, be associated 
with better performance.  Beyond that, performance will decline as the optimum ratio 
of back-office to front-line resources is exceeded. For these reasons, our first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Administrative intensity will have an inverted u-shaped relationship with 
organizational performance 
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Administrative Intensity and Performance in Big Organizations 
Previous studies have not evaluated the potential for administrative intensity to 
condition the effects of key organizational characteristics on performance. To fully 
comprehend when bureaucracy matters for organizational performance, it is necessary 
to analyse the moderating effects that administrative intensity might have on key 
internal organizational contingencies, especially the size and task complexity of 
organizations (Van de Ven, Ganco and Hinings 2013).   
The link between size and organizational performance has been widely studied 
(Jung 2013). Economic theory suggests that size has a positive effect on performance 
because economies of scale allow the fixed costs of service production to be spread 
across more units of output. Examples of physical fixed costs in universities include 
buildings and technical equipment to support teaching and research. As these facilities 
are used more intensively, so efficiency rises (up to a point of maximum utilisation 
when further investment in extra space or kit is required, after which the benefits of 
scale begin again). Other positive effects of large size have been identified, including 
lower costs associated with purchasing power, favourable rates on funds for new 
investment, greater capacity for innovation, and the ability to hire talented senior 
managers who are attracted to the challenge and rewards of running big organizations 
(Jung 2013). 
      An alternative perspective on the link between size and performance is provided 
by public choice theory, which suggests that economies of scale are eventually 
counter-acted by bureaucratic congestion (Boyne and Meier 2013). However, this is 
an administrative intensity effect rather than a size effect per se. In this paper, we 
differentiate these potentially countervailing forces by examining each of them 
separately. Whereas most previous studies have taken large size as a proxy for 
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bureaucratic congestion, we regard a high level of administrative intensity as a more 
accurate indicator of the overload associated with bureaucratic ‘empire-building’. 
This means that we are testing a ‘pure’ size effect that is purged of the effect of a 
bigger bureaucratic component.  We therefore expect to find a positive effect of size 
on performance. Hence, our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Organization size will be positively related to performance 
 
Although we are arguing that size and administrative intensity have distinct 
effects on performance, it also seems likely that they have combined effects 
(Damanpour, Szabat and Evan 1989). In particular, organizations with a large back-
office may have greater capacity to take advantage of economies of scale. In 
universities, a larger administrative function may be required to realise the potential 
efficiency gains of a large physical estate with multiple classrooms and highly 
specialised equipment that would not be fully utilised by a single research or teaching 
group acting in isolation. Similarly, a larger administrative team may be able to 
negotiate more effectively with external contractors and thereby exploit the potential 
purchasing power of big universities more effectively. Administrative support is also 
likely to be required to take advantage of the innovative capacity that is associated 
with organizational scale, for example by identifying replicable good practice in one 
sub-unit and spreading the benefits across other sub-units. We therefore expect that 
the presence of a large central bureaucracy boosts the positive relationship between 
organizational size and performance, and so, our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Administrative intensity will enhance the performance of big organizations 
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Administrative Intensity and Performance in Complex Organizations 
Task complexity is the core structural characteristic that Mintzberg (1979) associates 
with the archetypal professional bureaucracy, since in such organizations professional 
groups are arranged in discrete production units.  Complex professional bureaucracies 
are frequently plagued by conflicts between the centre and the sub-units, as well as 
between the sub-units themselves (Egeberg, 1999; Mintzberg 1979). Cohen and 
March (1974) liken universities, in particular, to “organized anarchies” in which 
organizational priorities are unstable and unpredictable, connections between means 
and ends are weak, and the cast of characters involved in decisions is highly fluid. 
This tendency towards anarchy is likely to be exacerbated by the task complexity 
associated with a large number of organizational sub-units. A high degree of 
departmental fragmentation can create may entail the diversion of resources towards 
the day-to-day management of inter-departmental conflicts, and towards attempts to 
re-establish strategic and operational alignment. Weaker alignment between the parts 
of public organizations has been found to lead to lower levels of performance 
(Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker, 2012). 
The empirical evidence on the impact of internal task complexity on 
organizational performance in the public sector is extremely sparse. Schmid’s (2002) 
study of therapeutic boarding schools in Israel found no relationships between 
occupational complexity and several measures of performance. Whetten (1978) 
presents evidence of mixed effects on the performance of US manpower agencies; 
internal task complexity was positively correlated with agencies’ productivity, but 
negatively correlated with employees’ perceptions of effectiveness. Hence, on the 
basis of arguments and evidence on the effects of a proliferation of organizational 
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sub-units in general, and the specific impact of organizational anarchy across multiple 
departments in universities, the fourth hypothesis that we test is:  
 
H4: Task complexity is negatively related to organizational performance. 
 
The potentially negative effects of task complexity may be offset by adding to 
the administrative component in an organization. In particular, it is likely to be 
necessary to develop a scale of administrative function sufficient to meet the demands 
of coordinating more than one separate sub-unit, and this will be especially important 
for highly divisionalised professional bureaucracies (Andrews and Boyne 2014). 
Organizations with a large administrative component can draw upon a core of slack 
administrative capacity to manage an expansion in the number of sub-units.  In fact, 
according to the “complexity-administrative growth hypothesis” (Rushing 1967), 
increased differentiation of organizational structures poses coordination challenges 
that can only be met through the expansion of the administrative function.  
  Since in complex organizations there is more pressure to devote 
administrative resources to overcoming the principal-agent dilemmas associated with 
securing goal alignment, it is likely that organizations with greater administrative 
capacity are able to overcome such coordination problems. Thus, when administrative 
intensity and task complexity combine so, too, do the prospects of service 
improvement, as senior management gains traction in its attempt to connect sub-units.  
These arguments lead to our final hypothesis, that: 
 
H5: Administrative intensity moderates the negative relationship between task 
complexity and performance. 
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RESEARCH CONTEXT, DATA AND MEASURES 
The data set for our analysis consists of 115 UK universities (90 located in England, 
13 in Scotland, 10 in Wales and 2 in Northern Ireland). Since the 1980s, UK higher 
education institutions (HEIs) have been subject to research performance assessments 
(Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs), now the Research Excellence Framework or 
‘REF’) coordinated by central government every six years or so. More recently, UK 
universities have also entered a more marketised educational environment where 
measures such as student satisfaction are regularly published and scrutinised, not only 
by potential university applicants but also by government. This shift to a more 
regulated and more competitive environment has meant that universities now invest 
more time and resources in developing strategies for improving research and 
educational programmes (Deem, Hillyard and Reed 2007). One consequence of this 
changing environment has been a widely reported rise in the numbers of managers in 
universities during the 2000s (Morgan 2010) – a trend also observed in the United 
States (Greene, Kisda and Mills 2010). 
For the analysis, we include only those UK universities that provide a broad 
range of courses for undergraduates and postgraduates, and we exclude the Open 
University due to its unique role and organizational structure. We focus on 
“comprehensive” universities to ensure that our analysis is based on a set of broadly 
comparable institutions. That is, ones that provide both undergraduate and 
postgraduate education, and are not focused solely on research or on a single 
academic discipline. So, for example, the Institute for Cancer Research and London 
Business School are excluded from our analysis. All the dependent and independent 
variables necessary for the study are drawn from the Resources of Higher Education 
11 
 
data published annually by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), the 
central body responsible for providing statistics on the performance of the sector to 
central government. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Organizational performance in the public sector is complex and multidimensional 
(Boyne 2003). The different interests of various stakeholder groups affect every stage 
of performance measurement: which criteria to select, how these should be weighted, 
which indicators should be used, and whether scores on these indicators are evidence 
of strong or weak performance. We sought to capture outcomes relevant to two key 
external stakeholders: central government and students.  
 The annual data on the performance of UK universities collected by HESA 
includes three measures that capture key aspects of universities’ research 
achievements: the total value (£) of Quality Research (QR) funding allocated by 
central government to each institution; the number of PhDs awarded by each 
institution; and the total value (£) of research grants and contracts won. QR funding 
was determined by the RAE, which classified the performance of the staff within 
universities as 4* (world-leading), 3* (internationally excellent), 2* (recognised 
internationally), 1* (recognised nationally), on the basis of their research outputs. The 
actual amount that institutions received changed on an annual basis due to shifts in the 
criteria on which it is distributed (e.g. departments achieving the highest possible 
grade in two consecutive RAEs received additional funds mid-way through the most 
recent RAE cycle). Because the research performance measures are unscaled raw 
measures of output quantity they need to be set against some relevant denominator, to 
ensure that they do not simply reflect the size of any given institution. We utilise the 
12 
 
total cost of the academic staff as a denominator because it captures the amount of 
resources committed to achieving better research performance and because it is the 
approach the UK Higher Education Statistics Agency uses to compare the research 
performance of different institutions. 
We measure the educational performance of UK universities using three 
different indicators. First, we use the average student satisfaction score (on a 
percentage scale of 0-100) achieved by the university as recorded in the National 
Student Survey (NSS). The NSS is an annual survey of all final year undergraduate 
students across the UK carried out by IPSOS MORI on behalf of central government. 
The response rate for the survey is about 75% of eligible students. Our second 
educational performance indicator is the percentage of leavers obtaining first degrees 
who, six months after graduation, are in employment or further study. This indicator 
is collected annually by HESA through the Destinations of Leavers in Higher 
Education (DLHE) survey. The response rate for the DLHE survey in 2007/08 was 
80% of graduates. The third measure of educational performance is the continuation 
rate for full-time first degree entrants. This indicator is collected annually by HESA. 
Each institution calculates whether students who start in a particular year are still in 
higher education one year later. We do not divide the education performance 
measures by the resources spent on academic staff, because these indicators are 
already scaled and hence are comparable across different institutions. 
 
Independent Variables 
Our administrative intensity measure, constructed using HESA figures on staffing, is 
simply the ratio of the total number of employees involved in administrative duties 
within each university divided by the number of academic employees. Administrative 
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employees in each university are defined as: managers; non-academic professionals; 
student welfare workers, careers advisers, vocational training instructors, personnel & 
planning officers; media, public relations and marketing occupations; library 
assistants, clerks and general administrative assistants; secretaries, typists, 
receptionists and telephonists. Academic employees are those who are responsible for 
planning, directing and undertaking teaching and research.  
The total headcount of the number of full and part-time staff employed by a 
university is used as the measure of size for the analysis. Although organizational size 
is a multidimensional concept (Kimberly 1976), we focus on absolute staffing levels 
as it provides a clear and transparent proxy for the operational scale of the disparate 
types of university within the UK HE system. Moreover, in the specific context of 
universities, staffing is firmly within the purview of senior management.  
Task complexity is measured as the number of academic cost centres (key 
subject areas) for which each university returns expenditure data to HESA. The 
number of production sub-units has been used as a measure of complexity in previous 
studies (e.g. Blau 1970; McKinley 1987). There are 34 different academic cost 
centres, ranging from clinical medicine through to design and creative arts (see 
Appendix A). Even if in practice, specific cost centres are part of broader faculties of, 
for example, physical or social sciences, the presence of more broad subject 
specialisms in a university is likely to reflect significantly greater task complexity.  
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Control Variables 
We include several measures that control for important organizational characteristics 
of UK universities. First, we include a measure of expenditure per head of staff to 
control for the level of resources in each university. Staff spending is anticipated to 
have a positive relationship with performance because it implies that an institution has 
invested in the human capital required to improve outputs (Crook, Todd, Combs, 
Woehr, and Ketchen 2011). We also add a measure of the budget surplus in the 
current financial year to control for the level of slack resources. A budget surplus 
implies that an institution has more spare capacity to make organizational 
improvements (George 2005). Next, to control for the task difficulty faced by 
universities we add a variable gauging the level of student disadvantage in each 
institution – measured as the percentage of students from neighbourhoods in the 
lowest quintile of higher education participation. A large literature highlights that 
there is a negative relationship between task difficulty and organizational performance 
(see Andrews 2010).  
In addition, we include controls for institution type. In terms of the staffing 
structure, we measure the percentage of academics involved purely in education; the 
percentage of academics involved purely in research; and the percentage of all staff 
carrying out technical duties in support of specialist research: laboratory, engineering, 
building, IT and medical technicians. We anticipate that a higher proportion of 
educational specialists will have a positive effect on educational performance, but not 
for research, with the opposite being the case for research specialists and support staff 
(Johnes 1996). In terms of the scope of the educational provision on offer, we 
measure the total number of different undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses 
offered by each institution; and the ratio of undergraduate students to postgraduates. 
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Due to the additional complexity that they create, the number of courses is expected 
to be negatively related to performance. A large undergraduate population is expected 
to serve as a further measure of the teaching focus of institutions.   
To control for reputational effects and institutional path dependency we also 
include a dichotomous variable coded one for all those institutions granted university 
status prior to 1992 and zero for those attaining it following the passing of the Further 
and Higher Education 1992 (which allowed polytechnics to become universities). Old 
and new universities have different missions, with old universities typically being 
more research-intensive and new ones being more teaching-focused. Hence, we 
anticipate that old universities will outperform new ones on our measures of research 
performance, while the new universities will do better on the measures of educational 
performance (see Johnes 1996). The descriptive statistics for all the variables included 
in the statistical models are shown in Table 1, and correlations are presented in 
Appendix B. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
METHOD 
We employ an estimation strategy that identifies between-institutional effects rather 
than within-effects because to fully specify our statistical models it is necessary to 
include the measure of old/new university, which is a time-invarying variable. This 
measure makes a large and statistical significant contribution to the explanatory 
power of our models, so to exclude it would be to introduce omitted variable bias into 
our analysis. That said, for our between-effects approach, we calculate Seemingly 
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Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimates with clustered robust standard errors, which 
means we control for unit fixed effects within our analysis. At the same time, SUR 
estimations also correct for serial correlation in the standard errors, thereby reducing 
the potential for residual autocorrelation to bias the regression estimates (Cochrane 
and Orchutt 1949). Because SUR relies on a random effects estimator, inclusion of a 
lagged performance measure biases the coefficients for key independent variables 
downwards (Angrist and Pischke 2009), and so to avoid problems associated with 
‘Nickel bias’ we estimate our equations without an auto-regressive term (for a similar 
approach see Rutherford 2016). 
SUR is used to control for the possibility that the error terms are correlated 
across separate regression models (Martin and Smith 2005). The Breusch-Pagan test 
of independence rejected the null hypothesis of no relationship between separate 
Ordinary Least Squares equations modelling the independent effects of administrative 
intensity, size and complexity on performance (p<.01). This suggests that universities’ 
achievements on each dimension of performance are correlated. The correlations 
between the residuals from the separate equations are presented in Table 2. There are 
strong positive correlations between the model predicting QR performance and the 
other models of research performance (.56 and .47). There is also a moderate positive 
correlation between the NSS model and the employment rate model (.23), and 
between the continuation model and the NSS (.31) and employment rate models (.31). 
This indicates that universities that do well on one of the measures of research 
performance are likely to do well on others, and that this applies, albeit to a lesser 
degree, for education performance. There is, though, less evidence to suggest that 
universities that perform well on research will also perform well in terms of 
education.  
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
To control for cross-equation correlations, SUR transforms the standard errors 
so that they all have the same variance and are no longer correlated, which thereby 
provides results that represent, in effect, a “pure” model of each organization’s 
achievements on each performance measure.  
Inclusion of dummy variables for each year of the analysis (minus one) further 
minimized the threat of serial correlation (Stimpson 1985). Aside from the collinearity 
generated by inclusion of the reciprocals of administrative intensity, and the 
interactions between administrative intensity and size and task complexity, the 
average VIF score for the independent variables is about 2.3. The results are therefore 
unlikely to be seriously distorted by multicollinearity. To further investigate whether 
collinearity might be a problem, we re-ran our estimations using mean-centred 
variables, which revealed virtually identical results (available on request). We do not 
present these mean-centred estimates because our discussion of the findings relies on 
the interpretation of the substantive effects of the independent variables, which is best 
facilitated by using the raw data. 
To control for the possible effect of outliers, all variables included in the SUR 
models are winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99% percentiles. Winsorizing refers 
to ‘pulling in and replacing extreme scores in a data set with less extreme values’ 
(Erceg-Hurn, Wilcox and Keselman 2013: 396). When winsorizing, the extreme 
values are changed to the next largest non-outlying data point, which helps maintain 
Type 1 error control, generating more statistically significant results when real effects 
exist in the population (Erceg-Hurn, Wilcox and Keselman 2013). Cook’s Distance 
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statistics suggested that between one and five percent of the observations are outliers, 
depending on the model. Hence, winsorizing the data at the top and bottom 1% and 
99% represents a robust yet comparatively conservative approach to managing the 
outliers in our dataset. 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 presents estimates of the separate effects of administrative intensity, 
organization size and task complexity on our measures of research performance and 
student outcomes. While we tested for both linear and non-linear administrative 
intensity effects (i.e. with and without a squared term), due to space limitations we 
only report the results for the squared term if it is statistically significant. Hence, only 
the “best-fitting” linear or nonlinear estimates of the administrative intensity-
performance relationship are shown. Following that, in Table 4, we present estimates 
incorporating interactions between administrative intensity and organization size 
within the models for the best-fitting estimates displayed in Table 3. Then, in Table 5, 
we show the results of adding interactions between administrative intensity and task 
complexity to the models. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The models presented in Table 3 explain 70-90% of the variation in the 
research performance of UK universities, but somewhat less of the variation in 
educational performance –  42% (employment rate) to 60% (continuation rate). The 
coefficients for the control variables are largely as expected. In particular, old 
universities perform better than new institutions on all six performance measures – a 
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finding that comports with prior research (Johnes 1996). As per our expectations, 
institutions with a higher proportion of staff employed on research only contracts 
perform better on research (see also Johnes 1996) and, perhaps surprisingly, have 
higher educational performance. The measure of research-only staff may be a proxy 
for the strength of the intellectual climate, which in turn has benefits for both teaching 
and research. As anticipated, universities that spend more money per staff member 
appear to do well on research performance. However, they seem to do worse on 
educational performance. This may be because the highest salaries are paid to 
‘research stars’ who devote less time to enhancing undergraduate outcomes. In 
accordance with our expectations, institutions with a large number of degree courses, 
and a high ratio of undergraduates to postgraduates, perform worse on most 
performance measures. Likewise, universities with a higher proportion of 
disadvantaged students tend to perform less well, which is consistent with prior 
evidence that ‘task difficulty’ is a constraint on organizational outcomes.  
The coefficients for administrative intensity are in the anticipated direction 
and achieve statistical significance for four of the performance measures: QR, grants, 
PhD performance and the student employment rate. These results lend support to our 
first hypothesis regarding the inverted u-shaped relationship between administrative 
intensity and organizational performance, and corroborate previous research 
(Rutherford 2016). Further analysis revealed that the tipping point for the benefits of 
administrative intensity to turn negative was above the mean level of intensity (0.46) 
for: QR funding (0.49); grants performance (0.54); and the employment rate (0.53). 
The tipping point for PhD performance was marginally below the mean (0.45). 
Overall, these results suggest that administrative intensity tends to bring a positive 
performance pay-off, but that above one standard deviation above the mean (0.52) 
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that pay-off turns negative. Seventeen universities had an average administrative 
intensity during the study period of 0.52 or more.   
To ensure that the bureaucratic congestion effects we identify are the product 
of administrative rather than scale diseconomies, we tested for non-linear size effects 
on performance. Since we found an inverted u-shaped relationship for only one 
performance measure (the student continuation rate), we have some confidence that 
the non-linearity in the administrative intensity-performance relationship that we 
observe captures the phenomenon of bureaucratic overload. Nevertheless, we find 
linear negative relationships between administrative intensity and student satisfaction 
and the student continuation rate. These results suggest that students are happier with 
their education when resources are allocated to the front-line rather than to back-
office functions.   
The findings for size indicate that big universities mostly have better research 
performance and a higher student continuation rate, which accords with our second 
hypothesis. However, small universities have higher levels of student satisfaction – a 
finding that comports with evidence on the relationship between community size and 
satisfaction more generally (Mouritzen 1989). At the same time, size seems to make 
no difference to students’ employment prospects. The sign for the task complexity 
coefficient is significantly negative for all three measures of research performance. 
However, it appears to be related to better student employment and continuation 
performance. Hence, we observe mixed support for our fourth hypothesis regarding 
the problems posed by task complexity. It is conceivable that the unexpected results 
here reflect the benefits of academic specialization for students. Firms which provide 
more differentiated products and services may be better able to target and market 
what they produce to a wider range of potential buyers (Porter, 1980). Universities 
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that provide a wider range of courses may similarly be fitting more of their students 
for the diverse employment opportunities in the graduate labour market.  
It is possible that the relationships we observe are a product of reverse 
causation. To further test the robustness of the separate effects that we identify, we 
carried out Granger tests to ascertain whether administrative intensity, size and 
complexity determine performance, or vice versa. These tests revealed that there was 
no statistically significant relationship between the lagged performance measures and 
administrative intensity, organization size or task complexity. Likewise, it is possible 
that reverse causation is responsible for the relationship between staffing spend and 
QR and grant funding. Again, we carried out Granger tests, finding limited evidence 
of reverse causality.  
In addition to carrying out these tests, we undertook further analysis to 
understand the extent to which administrative intensity (and its effects) may be driven 
by other factors that may impact performance. In particular, previous research has 
shown that organization size and task complexity are important determinants of 
administrative intensity – albeit they tend to exhibit a complex non-linear relationship 
with it (see Andrews and Boyne 2014; Rutherford 2016). From this perspective, it is 
clearly important that we include size and complexity alongside administrative 
intensity in our models estimating organizational performance. That said, the 
correlations between size, complexity and administrative intensity are comparatively 
small (see Appendix B), suggesting that these inter-relationships have a limited 
impact on our findings – something confirmed through supplementary mediation 
analysis (available on request).  
To fully explore when bureaucracy matters for organizational performance, it 
is necessary to analyse the combined effects of administrative intensity, size and 
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complexity on performance. Table 4 shows that for QR funding, research grants and 
student employability the interaction between administrative intensity and 
organization size is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that administrative 
intensity enhances the positive effects of size on these measures of university 
performance. Administrative intensity also seems to boost performance by partially 
offsetting the negative effect of size on student satisfaction, but appears to make no 
difference to the relationship between size and PhD awards or the student 
continuation rate.  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
To fully understand interaction effects it is necessary to calculate the marginal 
effects on the dependent variable at varying levels of the key independent variables 
(see Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Graphing the slope and confidence intervals 
of the marginal effects is an especially effective way to present this information. 
Accordingly, Figures 1-6 provide a graphical illustration of the moderating influence 
of administrative intensity on the relationship between size and university 
performance during the study period.  
 
FIGURES 1-6 HERE 
 
The centre line in figures 1-6 illustrates the predicted values of performance 
on the basis of administrative intensity and organizational size, controlling for the 
other variables in our model. The dotted lines represent the upper and lower 
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confidence intervals for those predicted values. The area above the upper bound and 
below the horizontal zero line indicates a statistically significant relationship. The 
figures offer a reasonable amount of support for our third hypothesis: there is a 
positive interaction between size and administrative intensity for QR performance, 
grants performance, NSS scores and the employment rate, but a negative interaction 
for the student continuation rate. Size and administrative intensity appear to have no 
combined effect on PhD performance.  
Substantive interpretation of the figures suggests the following: i) that the 
size-performance relationship for QR funding and grants is enhanced by any kind of 
increase in the proportion of administrative staff – the point at which the lower 
confidence interval touches the zero line is beyond the lower range of administrative 
intensity; ii) that the negative relationship between size and student satisfaction is 
eradicated when just over fifty percent of university staff are administrative 
employees (about one standard deviation above the mean); iii) that size has a positive 
relationship with the student employment rate once administrative intensity reaches 
sixty percent; and, finally, iv) that administrative intensity weakens the benefits of 
organization size for student continuation – the point at which it eradicates those 
benefits is beyond the range of our data (about seventy per cet). These findings 
largely provide support for the idea that administrative intensity enhances the 
relationship between organizational size and performance. To explore whether a 
similar pattern of findings is observed for universities with a large number of 
departments, we now turn to examine the moderating influence of administrative 
intensity on the task complexity-performance relationship. 
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TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Table 5 highlights that the interaction between administrative intensity and 
task complexity is positive and statistically significant for all three measures of 
research performance, but none of the measures of educational performance. Hence, 
complex universities with large numbers of administrative employees seem to have a 
research performance advantage over those with few administrators, confirming our 
argument that the benefits of a large administrative function may be especially 
important in organizations with a highly complex structure.  
 
FIGURES 7-12 HERE 
 
Figures 7-12 indicate that administrative intensity appears to moderate the 
negative relationship between complexity and QR, grants and PhD performance, 
providing strong support for our fifth hypothesis in the area of research performance. 
The negative complexity-performance relationship for QR and grants performance is 
eradicated for universities in which about forty-five percent of staff are administrative 
employees (nearly one standard deviation above the mean). For PhD performance, the 
negative effects of complexity are overturned at a similar level. For QR and grants 
performance, when about fifty-five percent of employees are administrative staff the 
relationship between complexity and performance actually turns positive. A similar 
pattern appears to exist for PhD performance, but the point at which the lower 
confidence interval touches the zero line (0.75) is beyond the range of the data. The 
interaction graph for the complexity-employment rate relationship indicates that from 
about the mean level of administrative intensity upwards (0.45), a larger 
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administrative function adds further value to the benefits of multiple departments for 
students’ employment prospects.  
In sum, the findings presented in figures 7-12 provide support for arguments 
regarding the benefits of administrative intensity for complex organizations. The 
results highlight that a large administrative function strengthens the research 
performance of complex universities. They are also suggestive of the possibility that a 
large cadre of administrators can make a positive contribution to the employment 
prospects of students beyond that attributable to disciplinary specialization within 
universities. Taken together, these results suggest that administrative intensity is 
especially valuable for complex organizations in dealing with external regulatory 
forces (such the RAE/REF) and external market pressures (winning research grants, 
recruiting PhD students, and placing their students in employment). Hence, a large 
central bureaucracy may help faculty members to navigate complex bureaucratic grant 
application processes and assist departments in the development of effective doctoral 
training programmes and careers advice provision.  
By contrast, administrative intensity makes little difference to the link between 
complexity and the internal pressures associated with achieving student satisfaction 
and retention. It is conceivable that bureaucratic support may be redundant in these 
instances because they are mainly a product of the professional expertise and 
autonomy of teaching staff. That said, we did investigate whether there might be 
circumstances in which central administrative support may be especially beneficial for 
students by testing whether administrative intensity moderates the (largely) negative 
relationship between student disadvantage and outcomes. This analysis revealed that 
administrative intensity moderated the negative relationship between disadvantage 
and two measures of education performance – student satisfaction and student 
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continuation (results available on request). Overall, then, our results are consistent 
with arguments that administrative intensity is needed to ‘buffer’ organizations from 
the external environment (Meier and O’Toole 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our study suggests that administrative intensity, organization size and task 
complexity have statistically significant independent and combined effects on 
organizational performance. There appears to be a predominantly inverted u-shaped 
relationship between administrative intensity and the performance of UK universities. 
At the same time, organizational size has a largely positive relationship with 
performance, but the task complexity-performance relationship is somewhat more 
mixed. Administrative intensity enhances both the size-performance and complexity-
performance relationships for certain dimensions of performance, especially those 
associated with research outcomes.  
Overall, our findings provide support for the arguments we develop about the 
ways in which bureaucracy matters for big and complex organizations. In this regard, 
the study confirms that contingency theory continues to be a valuable approach to 
understanding the design of high-performance organizations (Van de Ven, Ganco and 
Hinings, 2013). More practically, the pattern of evidence from our analysis suggests 
that big and complex public organizations can benefit from devoting additional 
resources to administration. Our evidence therefore supports three working 
assumptions: (a) administrative intensity can produce positive performance outcomes, 
up to a certain point; (b) big organizations can benefit from a bigger central 
bureaucracy; and (c) universities with a large number of departments can also capture 
additional performance benefits by increasing investment in administrative capacity. 
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That said,  university managers are faced with a series of complex design choices 
when considering the appropriate scale of administrative operations.  
A heuristic for visualising the potential implications of these choices is shown 
in Figure 13. The figure highlights that the potential coordinative gains from 
increasing administrative intensity in big and complex institutions (the movements 
from points X to Z, and Y to W) may be offset by the more general losses associated 
with bureaucratic congestion per se (the movement from point A to B). Of course, 
when seeking to harness the benefits of greater administrative capacity, senior 
university managers also need to take into account a host of other relevant 
considerations, particularly external opportunities and threats.   
 
FIGURE 13 HERE 
 
Despite the strengths of our analysis, the limitations of our study raise 
questions about the ways in which bureaucracy matters for organizational 
performance that are worthy of further systematic analysis. Firstly, we have studied an 
organizational population known to have comparatively high levels of administrative 
intensity – higher education institutions. It would be important to investigate whether 
the relationships we identify here are observed in other large professional 
bureaucracies, such as hospitals or local governments, which are known to have 
smaller central bureaucracies (e.g. Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker, 
2013). Secondly, our analysis is focused on only two (albeit critically important) 
aspects of university performance – research and teaching. Future research could 
examine the role that administrative intensity, size and task complexity play in 
shaping other important aspects of university activity, such as social innovation and 
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regional economic development. Finally, it is highly likely that administrative 
intensity may influence the relationship between other organizational factors, such as 
strategy, structure and process, and performance. Thus, more work needs to be 
conducted to uncover the full range of circumstances in which bureaucracy matters.  
To sum up, our evidence shows that bureaucracy may bring important benefits 
for organizational performance in the public sector. Administrative intensity appears 
to  be a burden only at above-average levels, and even then it may offer net benefits to 
large and complex public organizations.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (2005/06-2011/12) 
 
Mean Min Max S.D. 
Dependent variables 
    
QR/ per £1,000 academic 
staff spend 
214.57 .49 872.46 210.02 
Grants/ per £1,000 academic 
staff spend  
417.94 4.40 2359.17 484.94 
Phds/ per £1million  
academic staff spend 
.86 .02 2.27 .58 
NSS 81.77 68 92 5.38 
Student employment rate 90.98 79.9 97.4 3.48 
Continuation rate 91.65 80.6 98.6 3.87 
Independent variables      
Administrative Intensity 
 
.46 .34 .66 .06 
Total staff  2963.47 340 9610 1866.77 
Departments 18.89 6 29 4.72 
Control variables     
Total expenditure per head 
of staff (£’ooos) 
59.42 33.22 100.07 12.98 
Budget surplus (£’ooos) 4539.80 -10237 36021 7378.80 
Students from 
disadvantaged groups 
10.23 2.4 25.7 5.37 
% academic staff (teaching 
only) 
24.19 0 75.19 17.63 
% academic staff (research 
only) 
15.09 0 63.25 15.22 
% technical support staff  6.37 2.16 14.28 2.33 
Degree courses 90.96 24 184 31.02 
Undergraduate/ 
postgraduate ratio 
3.83 .72 14.88 2.14 
Old/New Universities .47 0 1 .50 
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Table 2 Correlations for SUR models  
 
 QR 
performance 
Grants 
performance 
PhD 
performance 
NSS Employment 
rate 
Grants performance  .56     
PhD performance .47 .20    
NSS .13 .22 .01   
Employment rate .01 .07 -.03 .23  
Continuation rate 
 
.16 .10 .10 .31 .31 
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Table 3 Administrative intensity, size, complexity and performance  
 
Independent variable QR performance Grants performance PhD performance NSS Employment rate Continuation rate 
Administrative intensity  2182.305** 
(534.925) 
1892.513* 
(1023.772) 
9.2761** 
(2.3893) 
-5.6771+ 
(3.1720) 
55.7482* 
(24.8107) 
-7.2083** 
(2.3878) 
Administrative intensity2 
-2251.298** 
(572.943) 
-1743.844+ 
(1089. 218) 
-10.3672** 
(2.4412) 
--- -54.7482* 
(25.7980) 
--- 
All staff 
.0266** 
(.004) 
.0863** 
(.0086) 
.00003 
(.00002) 
-.0004* 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.00046** 
(.0001) 
Departments 
 
-2.6604** 
(.866) 
-2.8610+ 
(1.6456) 
-.0199** 
(.0056) 
.0077 
(.0514) 
.1289** 
(.0384) 
.0678* 
(.0345) 
Budget surplus -.0004 
(.0004) 
-.0015 
(.0013) 
-1.32E-06 
(1.78E-06) 
-6.83E-06 
(.00003) 
-5.81E-06 
(.00002) 
.00002 
(.00002) 
Students from disadvantaged groups -1.4058** 
(.4439) 
3.5229**  
(1.0626) 
-.0099**  
(.0031) 
.0419 
(.0350) 
-.0718* 
(.0338) 
-.1880** 
(.0288) 
Expenditure per head of staff .1018 
(.2833) 
2.2655** 
(.6221) 
.0020 
(.0017) 
-.1301** 
(.0221) 
-.0950** 
(.0154) 
-.0627** 
(.0143) 
% academic staff (teaching only) .2522 
(.1623) 
.5940+ 
(.3164) 
.0020* 
(.0010) 
-.0193 
(.0115) 
-.0190+ 
(.0100) 
-.0075 
(.0099) 
% academic staff (research only) 6.3538** 
(.5110) 
21.456** 
(1.0444) 
.0070** 
(.0028) 
.1702** 
(.0267) 
.0478* 
(.0201) 
-.0940** 
(.0205) 
% technical support staff  1.883 
(1.3979) 
8.0566** 
(3.1044) 
-.0172* 
(.0084) 
.1365 
(.0920) 
-.0145 
(.0680) 
-.1078 
(.0785) 
Number of degree courses -.9928** 
(.1753) 
-2.8461** 
(.4119) 
.0024** 
(.0010) 
-.0094 
(.0103) 
-.0263** 
(.0071) 
-.0232** 
(.0063) 
Undergraduate/ 
postgraduate ratio 
-2.8610** 
(.9452) 
.3967 
(1.9639) 
-.0132* 
(.0068) 
-.4074** 
(.0829) 
-.1459* 
(.0702) 
-.0374 
(.0561) 
Old university 
 
174.3479** 
(10.0981) 
124.9891** 
(18.5437) 
.6498** 
(.0548) 
3.9656** 
(.5324) 
.8717+ 
(.4650) 
1.3451** 
(.4159) 
Constant -417.3224** 
(118.8999) 
-632.494** 
(230.7927) 
-1.4090* 
(.5694) 
92.5204** 
(1.8774) 
82.3810** 
(6.0081) 
100.4524** 
(1.5365) 
Chi2-statistic 6842.40** 8032.34** 1461.01** 684.28** 422.48** 872.76** 
R2 .923 .933 .718 .543 .424 .603 
N 575 575 575 575 575 575 
Note: significance levels: +p   ≤ 0.10; *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for year dummies not shown. 
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Table 4 Administrative intensity x size and performance 
 
 QR 
performance 
Grants 
performance 
PhDs 
performance 
NSS Employment 
rate 
Continuation 
rate 
AI x S .0990** 
(.0244) 
.2327** 
(.0538) 
.00003 
(.0001) 
.0047** 
(.0013) 
.0025** 
(.001) 
-.0006 
(.0008) 
Chi2-statistic 7075.79** 8360.63** 1461.33** 707.47** 431.96** 873.73** 
R2 .925 .936 .718 .552 .429 .603 
N  575 575 575 575 575 575 
Note: significance levels: +p   ≤ 0.10; *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in 
parentheses. All equations include the variables shown in Table 3.  
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Table 5 Administrative intensity x complexity and performance 
 
 QR 
performance 
Grants 
performance 
PhDs 
performance 
NSS Employment 
rate 
Continuation 
rate 
AI x C 30.4084** 
(8.7551) 
67.0459** 
(18.8715) 
.1500** 
(.0533) 
.7895 
(.5973) 
.4015 
(.5953) 
-.1843 
(.4045) 
Chi2-statistic 6973.63** 8193.67** 1492.52** 688.35** 423.91** 873.32** 
R2 .924 .934 .722 .545 .424 .603 
N  575 575 575 575 575 575 
Note: significance levels: +p   ≤ 0.10; *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in 
parentheses. All equations include the variables shown in Table 3.  
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Figure 1 Marginal impact of size on QR performance contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 2 Marginal impact of size on grants performance contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 3 Marginal impact of size on PhD performance contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 4 Marginal impact of size on NSS contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 5 Marginal impact of size on employment rate contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 6 Marginal impact of size on continuation rate contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 7 Marginal impact of departments on QR performance contingent on administrative 
intensity 
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Figure 8 Marginal impact of departments on grants performance contingent on administrative 
intensity 
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Figure 9 Marginal impact of departments on PhD performance contingent on administrative 
intensity 
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Figure 10 Marginal impact of departments on NSS contingent on administrative intensity 
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Figure 11 Marginal impact of departments on employment rate contingent on administrative 
intensity 
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Figure 12 Marginal impact of departments on continuation rate contingent on administrative 
intensity 
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Figure 13 Model of the high-performing organization 
 
42 
 
Appendix A Academic cost centres in UK universities (incl. HESA coding) 
 
01 Clinical medicine 
02 Clinical dentistry 
03 Veterinary science 
04 Anatomy & physiology 
05 Nursing & paramedical studies 
06 Health & community studies 
07 Psychology & behavioural sciences 
08 Pharmacy & pharmacology 
10 Biosciences 
11 Chemistry 
12 Physics 
13 Agriculture & forestry 
14 Earth, marine & environmental sciences 
16 General engineering 
17 Chemical engineering 
18 Mineral, metallurgy & materials engineering 
19 Civil engineering 
20 Electrical, electronic & computer engineering 
21 Mechanical, aero & production engineering 
23 Architecture, built environment & planning  
24 Mathematics 
25 Information technology & systems sciences & computer software engineering 
26 Catering & hospitality management 
27 Business & management studies 
28 Geography 
29 Social studies 
30 Media studies 
31 Humanities & language based studies 
33 Design & creative arts 
34 Education  
35 Modern languages 
37 Archaeology 
38 Sports science & leisure studies 
41 Continuing education 
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Appendix B Correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. QR                  
2. Grants .93**                 
3. Phds .84** .72**                
4. NSS .63** .58** .54**               
5. Student employment rate .36** .33** .26** .35**              
6. Continuation rate -.31** -.39** -.27** -.16** -.12**             
7. Administrative intensity -.04 -.00 -.09* -.24** -.06 -.04            
8. Total staff  .71** .80** .53** .39** .25** -.59** .04           
9. Departments .22** .31** .14** .11** .14** -.58** -.16** .58**          
10. Total expenditure  .36** .46** .26** .09* -.20** -.37** .16** .36** .21**         
11. Budget surplus  .26** .28** .20** .21** -.00 -.23** .01 .38** .18** .20**        
12. Disadvantaged students  -.63** -.56** -.55** -.35** -.33** .25** -.19** -.46** -.11** -.24** -.15**       
13. % teaching only staff -.18** -.27** -.08+ -.10* -.03 .34** .27** -.27** -.33** -.50** -.10* .09*      
14. % research only staff .91** .94** .70** .57** .34** -.43** -.08+ .80** .37** .45** .29** -.59** -.33**     
15. % technical support staff  .50** .58** .32** .31** .22** -.31** -.21** .57** .45** .30** .15** -.28** -.44** .62**    
16. Degree courses .35** .40** .33** .20** .15** -.62** -.11** .72** .76** .17** .23** -.23** -.28** .47** .48**   
17. UG/PG ratio -.47** -.41** -.44** -.42** -.21** .34** .06 -.38** -.03 -.17** -.20** .40** .10* -.42** -.19** -.22**  
18. Old/New Universities .86** .73** .81** .63** .32** -.27** -.13** .51** .16** .25** .20** -.55** -.08* .74** .33** .31** -.44** 
Note: significance levels: +p   ≤ 0.10; *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
